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The Economic Crisis and Labour Migration Policy in European 
Countries
Christiane Kuptsch
Abstract: This paper reviews changes in migration policies as a response to the 
2008 fi nancial and economic crisis and examines issues of migration governance. 
Countries in Europe opted to make new immigration more diffi cult, protected their 
labour markets for native born workers, encouraged the return of migrant workers 
and intensifi ed efforts to curb irregular migration. Clear patterns or reasons for vari-
ation in policy responses are not discernible, but it is safe to say that only countries 
with a signifi cant recent infl ux of migrants have taken high profi le measures at all. 
The crisis has led to a shift in perspective of the State and its role in economics 
which is now seen as useful instead of undesired. Previously prevailing neo-liberal 
thought relegated the State to the “high politics” of sovereignty and security issues. 
The crisis has highlighted labour market issues, and migrants are now increasingly 
portrayed as economic agents instead of security threats. This offers room for the 
State to assert its protective role vis-à-vis migrant workers – a welcome develop-
ment. The analysis has an International Relations/Political Economy perspective 
and is largely based on (offi cial) news releases and secondary sources.
Keywords: European countries · Financial and economic crisis · Labour migration · 
Crisis response · Restrictive policies · Migrants as workers · Role of the 
State
1 Introduction 
The global economic crisis that started in 2008 has led to a serious slowdown in 
world economic growth. Enterprises no longer hired new staff; some have resorted 
to short-time work arrangements (i.e. involuntary part-time employment or unpaid 
leave); there have been sizeable numbers of lay-offs, oftentimes starting with sepa-
rations from temporary workers. Although by late 2010 globally speaking economic 
growth had resumed, in advanced economies, employment is expected to return 
to pre-crisis levels only by 2015 (ILO 2010). Migrants tend to be among the workers 
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most hit by economic downturns for several reasons. From an economic perspec-
tive, migrant labour tends to be used as a cyclical buffer much like other macro-
economic policies aimed at maximising growth and minimising unemployment: 
migrants are often the last to be hired and the fi rst to be fi red; their employment 
relationships are frequently non-standard. From a social and political perspective, 
in times of economic insecurity migrants easily become scapegoats; xenophobic 
sentiments and discrimination against migrant workers rise.
This paper provides insights into the impact of the current fi nancial crisis on 
labour migration fl ows and on migration policy making. It focuses on affl uent mi-
grant receiving countries in Europe, looking at changes in the content of migration 
policies. What policy changes have occurred since the onset of the crisis? To what 
extent do the responses of various destination countries converge? What explains 
variations or similarities? These are some of the questions that will be addressed in 
the following sections. Final sections 6 and 7 refl ect on issues of migration govern-
ance and take a more normative perspective. It is suggested that the crisis might 
have some positive side effects in the area of migration policy making, especially 
since the crisis has contributed to altering visions of the State and its role in eco-
nomic policy.
2 Job shedding in sectors with large migrant employment 
In Europe as elsewhere, migrant workers are particularly concentrated in construc-
tion, manufacturing, agriculture, hotel and catering, and health and care work, in-
cluding domestic services. Some of these sectors are also especially hard hit by the 
current crisis. Certain economic sectors are more sensitive to business cycles than 
others. The employment elasticity is particularly high in construction, wholesale 
and hotels and restaurants – most job shedding has taken place here – but less so 
in health, social work and education. As the OECD notes, the effect of the economic 
downturn on migrants depends upon the situation in the country of destination and 
the impact on migrants is more visible in countries where the crisis began earlier, 
such as in Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom (OECD 2009: 7). 
Table 1 shows that in these countries, since the onset of the crisis, the unem-
ployment rate for migrant workers has been consistently higher than the rate for 
the native born labour force. Gaps between native and foreign born workers have 
tended to increase (see Table 2 for pre-crisis data). In Spain, the unemployment rate 
of men and women migrant workers combined reached almost 30 % in 2010, and 
the gap with the native born was more than 10 percentage points following the crisis 
whereas the gap had been relatively small before. 
The above data indicate that migrants in European destination countries are 
clearly hit by the fi nancial and economic crisis. It appears that women migrant work-
ers may suffer somewhat less from the crisis then male migrants because they tend 
to work in sectors less affected (such as health and domestic care).
Does this mean that migrants will return to their home countries or seek to fi nd 
employment elsewhere? And how have host countries dealt with these facts? 
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Tab. 1: Unemployment rates for native and foreign born workers (%), 
2009, 2010
Country  2009 2010 
  Native born Foreign born Native born Foreign born 
Ireland T 11.2 15.4 13.0 16.3 
 M 14.4 18.2 16.5 19.2 
 F 7.2 11.7 8.8 12.6 
Spain T 16.0 27.2 18.1 29.1 
 M 15.1 29.8 17.3 31.1 
 F 17.1 24.1 19.1 26.7 
United Kingdom T 7.5 8.9 7.8 9.1 
 M 8.7 8.9 8.8 9.2 
 F 6.1 8.9 6.6 9.0 
T = total; M = male; F = female
Source: OECD, Key statistics on migration in OECD countries, Labour market outcomes 
of immigrants 2008-2010, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/47/48335145.xls
Tab. 2: Comparison of pre-crisis unemployment rates for native and foreign 
born workers (%)
Country  Average 1995-2000 Average 2001-2006 
  Native born Foreign born Native born Foreign born 
Ireland T 8.4 10.4 4.1 5.7 
 M 8.6 10.6 4.5 5.9 
 F 8.1 10.2 3.7 5.5 
Spain T 20.1 20.6 10.7 12.9 
 M 14.2 15.8 7.3 9.9 
 F 26.3 25.4 14.1 15.9 
United Kingdom T 6.7 10.0 4.6 7.4 
 M 7.8 11.3 5.1 7.7 
 F 5.5 8.8 4.0 7.1 
8 4 10 4 4 1 5 7
T = total; M = male; F = female
Source: OECD, International Migration Outlook SOPEMI, 2008 Edition, Part IV Recent 
Changes in Migration Movements and Policies: 251, 279, 287, 289.
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3 Options for migrants: return, move on or stay? 
Unemployment of migrant workers does not mean that they will automatically leave 
their host countries. In fact, a September 2009 report by the Migration Policy Insti-
tute fi nds that roughly one year after the beginning of the crisis, “immigrants over-
whelmingly are choosing to stay put in their adopted countries rather than return 
home despite very high unemployment and lack of jobs” (MPI 2009: 5).
Whether the migrants wish to go back to their home countries or move on to 
a third country will largely depend on prospects in these countries.1 For example, 
Polish migrants in Ireland and the UK have moved back in large numbers with grow-
ing opportunities in Poland and contractions in the host country economies. Sump-
tion and Somerville (2009) estimate that some 1.5 million workers from the eight 
Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 (the “A8” countries) came to 
the UK between May 2004 and September 2009,2 and that almost half of them had 
gone back by the end of 2008. Not only did prospects in Poland improve, but past 
income differentials constituted a clear incentive to migrate and have melted down 
due to exchange rate adjustments. In 2003, the monthly average wage in Poland 
was £800, whereas in England it was more than double. However, the value of the 
British currency decreased in relation to the Polish zloty, from £1 equal to 7.23 zloty 
in 2004 to £1 equal to 4.83 zloty in 2008.3
Situations where circulation between countries is easy for the migrants repre-
sent incentives to return (Cassarino 2008). Such a situation is given in the case of 
Polish workers in the UK and Ireland as these two countries have fully recognised 
EU freedom of movement provisions so that workers from the 2004 accession coun-
tries can work in Ireland and the UK without restrictions. In the latter country, all 
that is required is registration under the Workers Registration Scheme (WRS) but 
there is no labour market test that gives preference to UK workers, and there are no 
quotas.4 Similarly, Eastern European workers with EU passports quit Spain knowing 
that they can come back without problems from 2011 when freedom of movement 
regulations become effective in all EU-15 Member States; and so do some Moroc-
cans with permanent resident status in that country.
The migrants’ personal characteristics and situations will also determine their 
options, such as their educational attainment, their reasons for having migrated 
(e.g. to join a family member), their immigration status and their length of stay in 
the country of destination. The latter will often determine their eligibility for welfare 
1 For a discussion see Awad (2009), OECD (2009).
2 Sumption and Somerville estimate these numbers in taking the total number of approved Work-
er Registration Scheme (WRS) applications (1,001,475) and multiplying it by 1.49 to account for 
some 33 % of A8 workers that are estimated not to register with the scheme. This follows a 
methodology developed by Pollard, Latorre and Sriskandarajah in 2008 (Sumption/Somerville 
2009: 13, footnote 7). 
3 Home Offi ce and Poland’s statistic offi ce in Alexi Mostrous and Christine Seib “Polish plumbers 
pack their bags as pickings get richer back east”, 16 February 2008, The Times.
4 Not all A8 workers register with the WRS; it is estimated that about one third of the migrants do 
not, see above. 
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benefi ts in the host country. Migrant workers who have long been in a country of 
destination are also more likely to have established roots and set up networks that 
help them withstand the effect of job losses in times of crisis. This ability to adjust 
will be reinforced if the workers enjoy a regular status. 
Many temporary foreign worker schemes do not allow change of employer, 
while more permanent migrant workers can change their employer and they are 
also entitled to unemployment and other welfare benefi ts to bridge the job seek-
ing time. Migrants in irregular situations can of course not make claims to social 
benefi ts but their employment opportunities might actually be better than those 
of migrants under certain temporary schemes – their informal employment is less 
costly to employers who might hire them, faced as they are with tighter credit and 
lower revenues. The outcome for the migrants may then be that their conditions of 
work worsen drastically (wages, working hours, etc.). 
Generally it is assumed that people with higher educational attainment will fi nd 
it easier to adjust to job losses. In recent years there has been outright competition 
for global talent, for highly skilled migrant workers, with destination countries facili-
tating their admission and employment. There was what can be labelled a “human 
capital mercantilism” with policy makers arguing that having more highly skilled mi-
grants was a rational move to raise the productivity and the competitiveness of the 
destination countries’ economies (Kuptsch/Pang 2006). Overall it should therefore 
be safe to say that highly skilled migrants will be less affected by the fi nancial and 
economic crisis.5
4 Host country reactions: Restrictive policies
In view of rising unemployment numbers among migrant workers and in line with 
increasingly protectionist attitudes in other areas such as trade, authorities in des-
tination countries around the world rapidly reacted to the crisis by attempting to 
make new immigration more diffi cult, protect labour markets for native born work-
ers, clamp down on migrants in irregular situations and encourage the return of mi-
grant workers. Measures were often taken as a result of public pressures, including 
in Europe.
There is consensus in the economic literature that in the longer run new immi-
grants have very little or no impact on labour market outcomes for the pre-existing 
population (e.g. in terms of earnings or unemployment). For example, theoretical 
studies invalidate the replacement postulate, i.e. the frequent assumption that im-
migrants occupy the jobs of native workers. An economy tends to create jobs in 
proportion to the number of its residents and consumers, and immigrants eventu-
ally help to create a number of jobs in proportion to the size of their community. Em-
pirical studies fi nd that the overall economic impact of immigration is small, though 
5 This does not mean that they stay unaffected. For a detailed analysis see Cerna (2010).
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opinions are mixed regarding whether the impact is small positive, small negative 
or zero.6
Yet, in the political arena these propositions keep being challenged. Research 
in European countries has also shown that different opinions about admitting mi-
grants are impacted more by cultural than by economic cost-benefi t perceptions, 
i.e. people are more concerned about the effects that migrants may have on chang-
ing the neighbourhood than about their impact on wages (Card/Dustmann/Preston 
2009). 
4.1 Reduced infl ows and intensifi ed efforts to curb irregular migration
In the United Kingdom, a number of changes were made to the relatively new Points-
Based System (PBS), adopted in February 2008 for assessing immigration applica-
tions. This system re-categorised over 80 different routes to employment and edu-
cation in the UK to just fi ve tiers: Tier 1: highly skilled individuals (previously Highly 
Skilled Migration Programme); Tier 2: skilled workers with a job offer to fi ll gaps in 
the UK labour force; Tier 3: low skilled workers to fi ll temporary labour shortages; 
Tier 4: students wanting to come to the UK to study, including student nurses; and 
Tier 5: youth mobility and temporary workers. Under the PBS, migrant workers and 
students must gain points to qualify for each specifi c tier before they can apply for 
permission to enter, or remain in, the UK. Points are awarded, depending on the tier, 
based on the qualifi cations, experience, age, earnings, maintenance and language 
competence of the candidate.7
The UK Home Offi ce strengthened the labour market test for high demand occu-
pations such as civil engineers and nurses. This will affect migrants who seek entry 
under Tier 2 of the UK Points-Based System (PBS), i.e. non EU-nationals with a con-
fi rmed job offer in a sector of labour market shortage. Employers must now adver-
tise jobs to resident workers through the national employment service (JobCentre 
Plus) before being able to recruit a worker from outside of the European Union. The 
UK also tightened the criteria against which highly skilled migrants, eligible for com-
ing to the country under Tier 1 of the PBS, are judged. The minimum qualifi cations 
were raised to a masters degree and the required salary to at least £20,000 (MPI 
2009: 57). Tier 3 of the PBS, covering low skilled workers to fi ll temporary labour 
shortages, was in any case suspended. 
France responded to the crisis by making it harder for migrants to live and work 
in the country illegally. In September 2009, French authorities dismantled and bull-
dozed a camp of undocumented migrants outside Calais, rounding up almost 300 
Afghans, Pakistanis and others who had gathered there for years in the hope of 
making clandestine journeys across the Channel to Britain. Earlier in the year, high-
profi le worksite raids had taken place in the region (New York Times, 22 September 
2009, and 21 April 2009). 
6 For a detailed analysis see Sweetman 2010 (on North America) and Domingues Dos Santos 
2010 (on Europe). 
7 For more information see: http://www.immigrationmatters.co.uk/uk-immigration.
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Italy went further in this direction and passed legislation criminalising unlawful 
presence, increasing the maximum period of detention of migrants in irregular situ-
ations and prohibiting access to public services such as emergency medical care 
and education to unauthorised migrants. In addition, citizen patrols got permission 
to assist police in responding to immigration violations (MPI 2009: 57). Italy also 
lowered its quota for entries. The 2009 ceiling for entries was capped at 150,000, 
i.e. 20,000 less than in 2007. Entry was essentially limited to domestic work and only 
taking applications from the backlog with the government arguing that most appli-
cants were already in Italy without documents (OECD 2009: 25). 
In Spain, the Contingente (the quota for workers to be recruited anonymously 
from abroad) was set at 901 for 2009 versus 15,731 in 2008. In October 2008, the 
Régimen General (list of diffi cult to cover occupations) contained 32 % fewer oc-
cupations than the previous list and the occupations which were taken from the list 
represented almost all hiring from abroad. Mostly specifi c qualifi ed occupations 
(such as neurosurgeon, dentist, and physiotherapist) remained (OECD 2009: 26). 
Spain therefore is one of the countries where highly skilled migrants might be less 
affected by the crisis. 
4.2 Return programmes
In response to increasing numbers of migrants applying for social benefi ts, Spain 
also introduced a voluntary return programme for unemployed legally resident mi-
grants (from 20 non-EU countries having social security agreements with Spain). 
It was estimated that between some 90,000 and 140,000 people would re-migrate 
under this plan8 where unemployed migrant workers who are registered with the 
Public Employment Service commit to not returning to Spain for three years.9 The 
payment is made in two lump sums, a fi rst one in Spain (40 %) and a second in the 
origin country (60 %).10 Less migrants than expected have shown interest.11 In addi-
tion, the Spanish Public Employment Service has started to work with its Romanian 
counterpart to recruit Romanians to return home (OECD 2009: 29).
Similarly, the Czech Republic set up a voluntary return programme where ap-
plicants must be legal, non-EU residents, holding a valid residence permit. Some 
analysts say that the economic crisis was one of the reasons to limit foreign work-
ers’ presence in the Czech Republic but that irregular migration, especially from Vi-
8 The Economist, “Global Migration and the Downturn” 15/01/2009 cites a number of 87,000; the 
Migration Policy Institute says “The government estimated that 140,000 unemployed workers 
would be eligible to participate” (MPI 2009: 67).
9 The migrant worker is supposed to return together with all other family members who do not 
have an independent residence permit and who have used the family reunion policy to come to 
Spain and obtain a resident permit.
10 http://www.planderetornovoluntario.es/index_uno.html.
11 Offi cial fi gures report some 20’000 returns between the launch of the programme and late 2010. 
See http://www.simplynetworking.es/news-6985-31-the_number_of_immigrants_in_spain_is_
falling_as_migrant_workers_return_home.html.
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etnam and Mongolia, had already started to undermine foreign worker admissions 
before the crisis. Therefore, combating the factors leading to irregular migration, 
such a regulating unscrupulous labour intermediaries, would make sense, in par-
ticular since many Vietnamese appeared to have well integrated into Czech society, 
having learned the language and occupying posts shunned by locals or being self-
employed (Plewa 2009). 
4.3 Sweden as a deviant case
In December 2008, Sweden introduced a new immigration law that made it easier 
for non-EU migrants to work in the country. Decisions on the need for foreign work-
ers will now be made by employers, and no longer a central government body. Un-
der the new system, once a job vacancy has been advertised nationally and across 
the EU for two weeks, companies can choose to recruit from elsewhere and need 
only inform the Swedish Migration Board whose role it will be to ensure that work-
ing conditions and terms of employment for migrants are equal to those of Swedish 
employees. Previously, unions had to be consulted before workers were hired from 
abroad and the national employment agency required proof that the skills were not 
available at home. The new law opens up Sweden’s labour market to workers of all 
skill levels. The rules also allow asylum seekers whose applications have been re-
fused to be granted work permits if they were employed in Sweden for six months 
at least and make it easier for foreign students to get work. Immigrants receive work 
permits for up to four years, after which they qualify for permanent residence. Mi-
gration minister Tobias Billström justifi ed the policy changes by referring to the cri-
sis and said: “It’s especially important during a downturn to ensure that businesses 
capable of expanding their activities are able to do so without being hindered by 
unnecessary bureaucracy.” (Sullivan, The Irish Times, 12 December 2008)
5 Categories of policy changes and assessment
The above account has summarised changes in migration policy, introduced after 
the onset of the crisis, which have “hit the news”. 
Before indicating some of the reasons for States not to take major measures and 
keep policies stable, an attempt is made in table 3 to categorise the host country re-
actions described above, according to possible policy changes at different levels. 
Policy changes can come at three broad levels. They can be made by (i) introduc-
ing new rules, (ii) adapting existing rules without touching the overall structure of 
the system, and (iii) applying rules differently. 
Nothing much is known about how countries apply existing rules, therefore the 
empty spaces in table 3 under point (iii). It could very well be that a different ap-
plication leads to tighter de facto policies. Where only administrative procedures 
change, these do not always have to be publicly discussed and be fully transparent 
to the social partners or the population. Labour market tests are an example. Public 
authorities exercise a signifi cant degree of discretion in judging the good faith of 
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employers in properly advertising their job offers. Another example is labour in-
spection. Labour inspection can be used to make sure that migrant workers benefi t 
from equal treatment with local workers (e.g. concerning their wages and working 
conditions) but it can also be used to identify migrants in irregular situations for 
subsequent expulsion.
5.1 Policy changes vs. stable policies
There is not enough evidence to state that structural or systemic differences such 
as a different organisation of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990) explain or 
have infl uenced the types of crisis responses taken or that there are any other clear-
ly discernible patterns.
Tab. 3: Categories of policy changes
Level of change Examples of policy changes Country examples 
(i) New rules New legislation is introduced, 
policies are reversed 
New Swedish immigration 
policy 
Italy’s new legislation on 
criminalising migrants in 
irregular situations 
 New programmes are 
introduced 
Return programmes in the 
Czech Republic and Spain 
   
(ii) Adaptation of rules Points systems raise the 
“pass mark” 
United Kingdom: Tier 1 of the 
PBS 
 Criteria for labour market 
tests become tighter 
United Kingdom: Tier 2 of the 
PBS 
 Shortage occupation lists are 
reduced 
Spain: Régimen General   
 Numerical limits (quotas, 
targets, caps) are reduced 
Italy: entry quota 
Spain: Contingente 
   
(iii) Application of 
rules 
Labour market tests are done 
with more scrutiny 
 
 Labour inspection becomes 
more frequent / targets 
sectors and workplaces with 
a high concentration of 
migrants 
French high profile worksite 
raids 
 Rules on service delivery are 
not applied, e.g. more 
backlogs are allowed with 
regard to visa procedures 
and work permit delivery 
 
Source: own design
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The countries that most hit the news with their policy changes were also the 
ones that had lately seen the biggest infl ows of migrant workers and where mi-
grants were having a signifi cant effect on employment growth (the UK and Ireland, 
Southern European countries, the Czech Republic). The Migration Policy Institute 
reports that nearly seven in ten new workers in the United Kingdom were migrant 
workers for example (MPI 2009: 6). This corroborates the thesis of migrant workers 
being used as cyclical buffers. 
European countries that had not opened their doors to the 2004 EU-accession 
countries and had followed a “welcome-the-skilled and rotate-the-unskilled” policy 
(Kuptsch/Martin 2011: 34) kept this in place. In Germany, for example, where a new 
immigration policy favouring highly skilled infl ows had been introduced in 2005, 
this has not been touched. Major changes in comparison to the “old system” include 
the following. The previous fi ve titles of legal residence were reduced to two, a tem-
porary residence permit (befristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis) and a settlement permit 
(unbefristete Niederlassungserlaubnis). While the recruitment stop persists for low 
and semi-skilled persons, highly qualifi ed migrants have access to a settlement per-
mit from the beginning. The same favourable conditions also exist for people who 
invest at least EUR 1 million or create at least ten jobs. Foreign students may stay up 
to one year after their graduation in Germany to fi nd a job; previously, most non EU-
students had to leave within 90 days.12 In the recent past, Germany has also relied 
substantially on migrants for seasonal agricultural work and introduced no changes 
to this programme. Indeed, rural employment tends to be relatively stable in affl u-
ent destination countries and seasonal agricultural labour migration programmes 
therefore unaffected by the crisis. 
There are certain fl ows of migrants that countries cannot restrict rapidly or can-
not restrict at all, as restrictions would imply human rights violations or non-respect 
of rights that migrants have acquired. Humanitarian fl ows and family reunifi cation 
are cases in point. 
Policy changes are also not always possible because of multilateral and bilat-
eral commitments. Where countries have undertaken to accept the free movement 
of labour within regional integration areas such as the European Union for exam-
ple, they cannot easily step down from their obligations. Similarly, a number of 
European countries have concluded bilateral agreements that fi x (usually annual) 
quotas for temporary work of migrants in certain sectors of the economy. Where 
such agreements are based on memoranda of understanding (MoUs) between em-
ployment services instead of international treaties they might be more easily dis-
solved, nonetheless this requires negotiations, and recruitment stops cannot simply 
be announced unilaterally. Germany for example brings in nursing and care per-
sonnel from Croatia and Slovenia based on memoranda of understanding between 
12 For more details and the history of the 2005 immigration reform in Germany see Martin/Abella/ 
Kuptsch (2006: 98-102). 
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the German Employment Service and its foreign counterparts.13 Austria, France, 
Germany and Switzerland all have trainee programmes in place, founded on either 
MoUs or bilateral agreements. 
Labour migration policies do not exist in a vacuum and although labour short-
ages remain the principle reason for today’s temporary foreign worker schemes, 
foreign policy considerations loom large in several programmes. For example, Po-
land made employment of its workers an issue during negotiations on the recogni-
tion of the Polish-German border. Italy and Spain opened legal migration channels 
to Albania and Morocco in part to encourage cooperation with these governments 
in the fi ght against irregular migration. Other objectives in setting up migration pro-
grammes include the wish to promote cultural exchange or development in the mi-
grants’ countries of origin. Migration restrictions could reinforce the crisis in send-
ing countries resulting in increased irregular migration, an extremely undesired 
outcome for destination countries. Trade relations and dependencies on supplies 
of particular commodities and/or energy from migrant sending countries may also 
cause receiving countries to refrain from adopting restrictive policies. 
This shows that there are quite a few reasons for countries not to openly change 
their policies despite the economic and fi nancial crisis. And what might be the ex-
pected life span of those changes that were introduced?
5.2 Permanent changes? (Short-term and long-term effects of policy 
changes)
Shortage lists and numerical limits (so far as the latter are not fi xed in bilateral 
agreements) can easily be adapted and can have a rapid impact on migration fl ows. 
Points systems can raise pass marks but also quickly bring them back down again. 
Where labour market tests become stricter either via tighter rules or because they 
are done with more scrutiny, this can also be rapidly reversed. And more or less 
staff and fi nancial resources can be allocated to visa and work permit delivery, 
yielding expanded or reduced immediate infl ows. The adaptation of existing rules 
and their different application tend to be less permanent in nature and more easily 
to be reversed than new pieces of legislation. 
Therefore, both the new Swedish immigration policy and Italy’s new legislation 
on criminalising migrants will be more diffi cult to repeal than the cap on migrants’ 
infl ows under the Spanish Contingente. However, are these legislative reforms in 
Italy and Sweden really products of the fi nancial and economic crisis or has the 
crisis only been used to justify changes that would have occurred anyway given 
political constellations?
In Italy, the legislative changes are very much in line with pre-crisis policy stands 
on migrants and immigration taken by the Berlusconi government. 
13  For the programme rules see ZAV (2004). 
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The Swedish reform with its liberal provisions on labour migration and its de-
ferral to employers of immigration decisions, appears to be more the result of a 
particular political set up than a direct consequence of the crisis. Cerna (2009) con-
vincingly explains how immigration policy in Sweden is the outcome of coalition 
building and shifting coalitions over time between native high-skilled labour, native 
low-skilled labour and capital. In 2006 the government changed with the centre-
right coalition government presenting a more capital-oriented position, weakening 
the link between unions and the government (p. 37).
Assisted voluntary return programmes, such as now implemented in Spain and 
the Czech Republic, tend to linger on as the historical experience of the Netherlands, 
France and Germany shows. European return programmes emerged for the fi rst 
time after the 1973 oil crisis had led to a recession. All of them had a long life span 
and were considered unsuccessful. In 1974 the Netherlands launched their ‘Reinte-
gration of Emigrant Manpower and Promotion of Local Opportunities for Develop-
ment’ programme which lasted until the mid 1980s and focussed on entrepreneurial 
ventures. Around the time when the Dutch programme closed down, the German 
‘Act to Promote the Preparedness of Foreign Workers to Return’ was passed, in 
1983. The German scheme was discontinued in the early 1990s only, despite a low 
take up rate. It offered cash payments to returning migrants similarly to the French 
Aide au retour programme of 1977. The latter was aimed at migrants from North and 
West Africa, especially Algerians, but was mainly used by Portuguese and Spanish 
migrants in France. In the period 1977 – 1981 some 60,000 migrants returned (out of 
which only 4 % were Algerians), not exactly meeting the declared target of 1 million 
returnees (Sward 2009).  
All in all, it seems fair to conclude that the crisis has not led to major system 
changes in European countries. It has mainly led to an adaptation of existing rules, 
and possibly to a different application of rules, which can both be reversed rapidly.
6 The crisis as an opportunity: A new perspective on migration 
governance?
States have the responsibility for protecting migrant workers from abuses and en-
suring that they actually enjoy the equal treatment and equal opportunity rights that 
exist under international law, as for example set out in ILO Conventions No. 97 and 
143.14 In practice, it is the role of Ministries of Labour and employment services and 
14 ILO Convention No. 97, adopted in 1949, in a context of (anticipated) migration fl ows in the 
aftermath of World War II is about migration management while protecting workers crossing 
borders. It aims to ensure equal treatment for them by encouraging countries to sign bilateral 
agreements. Convention No. 143 (1975) was enacted after oil-price hikes led to recessions in 
European countries that had been importing large numbers of guest workers and stopped re-
cruitment as a response to the economic downturn. C143 deals with clandestine migration (to 
be expected with legal channels being closed) on the one hand (Part I) and with equality of op-
portunity and treatment and the integration of settled migrants on the other (Part II).
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other institutions supervised by Ministries of Labour to administer protective pro-
grammes and make sure that non-discrimination norms are respected.
The crisis may mean an opportunity as it has shifted perspectives and may lead 
to an expanded role of Labour Ministries in migration policy making. First, perspec-
tives on the State and State action in general seem to have evolved; and second, as 
concerns migration policy, the crisis has brought more of a focus on labour policies 
and less on security issues, as will be argued in the following.
Since approximately the 1980s (the Reagan-Thatcher years) neo-liberal thought 
with its particular vision of the State has dominated economic and social policy mak-
ing in Europe. Neo-liberalism is very much a theory about economic arrangements, 
e.g. against State interference with private property and in market exchanges. The 
focus is on free markets. “Classical” liberalism in contrast is primarily about human 
freedoms, protecting individuals from unacceptable State incursions on their lib-
erty, and ensuring that all individuals within the polity are able to enjoy these rights. 
Liberalism is also the theory that highlights the equal treatment of all individuals 
irrespective of their particular characteristics; the universal applicability of liberal 
rights; and the need to limit State power over the individual (Hansen 2011).
Glivanos (2008) points out that current neo-liberal thought combines two strands 
of classical theory, especially to explain the function of private property: The Aus-
trian tradition views market individualism as maintaining individual freedoms (Hay-
ek, Ludwig von Mises, Schumpeter) while neoclassical economists emphasise the 
importance of markets to achieve effi ciency (Chicago School of Economics). Ha-
Joon Chang (2002) views this combination as an “unholy alliance” that results in an 
unfavourable perception of the State and its role. The State is no longer seen in its 
benevolent function, as under Keynesianism; it has lost its role as impartial arbiter 
and social guardian. Instead, the State is perceived as an organisation catering to 
self-interested bureaucrats and politicians who work for their client groups and not 
in the general interest. 
This vision of the State also goes hand in hand with the thought that there are 
“high politics” and “low politics”, with sovereignty and security issues fi guring at 
the high end, in contrast to economic, labour and social policy.15 At most the State 
should be in charge of “high politics” but preferably not interfere in other issues and 
leave them to market regulation. Indeed, the State’s role in security issues is less 
contested by neo-liberal thought. Labour Ministries, on the other hand, have been 
accused of being “spending ministries” open to group interest pressure. For Labour 
Ministries this has meant an erosion of their role: a shrinking of their responsibilities 
and cutbacks in budget allocations. Their human, material and symbolic resources 
have increasingly paled (Minet 2001). 
One of the areas, in which the role of the Labour Ministries has been reduced, is 
migration. At EU level the Directorate-General (DG) Home (i.e. internal affairs) and to 
some extent the DG External Relations drive much of the migration policy making, 
15 These concepts come out of the Realist school of thought in International Relations theory. For 
a criticism of this dichotomy, see e.g. Ripsman (2004).
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not leaving this to their colleagues in the DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclu-
sion (which would correspond to the Labour Ministry at the national level). France 
created a new Ministry for Immigration, Integration and Identity in 2007. Migration 
had previously been a responsibility of the Labour Ministry. In the United Kingdom 
migration issues are dealt with by the Home Offi ce (the Ministry of the Interior); it is 
the UK Border Agency that publishes approved shortage occupation lists. 
The current fi nancial and economic crisis is seen by many as the result of too 
much (neo-liberal) market focus and neglect of (liberal) rights-based approaches. 
States have been essential in stabilising fi nancial and economic systems, challeng-
ing the view that markets are best left alone. 
As concerns migration, the crisis has highlighted labour market issues. Migrant 
workers made the news as economic agents, not as security threats, criminals or 
potential terrorists as was often the case before the crisis. The media and certain 
politicians have not always portrayed migrants as positive economic agents (“they 
take away our jobs and should be sent home – local workers fi rst”, see e.g. the 
analysis by Castles and Vezzoli 2009). Nonetheless this type of headlines has shifted 
the discussion to economic questions.
The crisis has also sharply reduced prospects for migrants to fi nd a job in Eu-
ropean destination countries without a prior job offer, work permit and other pa-
pers. The El Dorado image of Europe suffered, leading to less people trying to enter 
without authorisation, at least in the period before the so-called “Arab Spring” of 
2011. Research in the United States indicates a strong correlation between the fl ows 
of unauthorised migrants and economic opportunities in the country (in politically 
stable times). For example US Border Patrol apprehensions data show that fl uctua-
tions in migrant apprehension are closely related to labour demand (Passel/D’Vera 
2009). Similarly, a post-crisis Frontex16 analysis reported a decline in illegal border 
crossing in the European Union: the number of illegal border crossings in the fi rst 
quarter of 2009 was 16 % lower than one year earlier. For the fi rst time in years, not 
a single immigrant boat was intercepted off the Canary Islands in the spring of 2009, 
according to the Spanish Interior Ministry (MPI 2009: 22-23). 
Border controls are normally the number one rapid reaction by States to stem 
the fl ow of migrants. If these are less necessary because the border is no longer 
“threatened”, this could additionally shift attention away from security issues to-
wards labour and employment questions. 
Neo-liberal (market-based) approaches to labour migration tend to look at overall 
(global) gains from migration and less at distributional effects. They see migrants as 
rational actors who may be willing to accept unfavourable labour conditions in host 
countries because these may still be better then what they would fi nd at home or 
because they are simply faced with extremely limited options. Liberal (rights-based) 
approaches, on the other hand, include the notion that the State has a protective 
16 Frontex is a EU agency based in Warsaw, created as a specialised and independent body tasked 
to coordinate the operational cooperation between Member States in the fi eld of border secu-
rity.
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function, including also protecting people from themselves and some of their own 
decisions, e.g. to submit themselves to abuse.
With a revival of the State in the economic arena, a renewed view of migrants 
as workers and more liberal (rights-based) approaches to policy making in general, 
there should be room for Labour Ministries to assert their protective role vis-à-vis 
migrant workers. 
7 Conclusions and outlook
The preceding sections have shown that migration policy reactions to the fi nancial 
and economic crisis were essentially of four types. Countries in Europe opted to 
make new immigration more diffi cult, protect labour markets for native born work-
ers, clamp down on migrants in irregular situations and encourage the return of 
migrant workers. Clear patterns or reasons for variation in policy responses are not 
discernible, but it is safe to say that only countries with a signifi cant recent infl ux of 
migrants have taken high profi le measures at all.
The trend was for reactions to be in the form of an adaptation and tighter appli-
cation of existing rules. This is understandable as legislative reforms, especially in 
an area as sensitive as migration policy, tend to be lengthy processes. They require 
preparations and negotiations. Where they occurred, as in Sweden and Italy, they 
can be traced back to pre-crisis developments such as shifting coalitions and par-
ticular political constellations.
Manifold constraints in areas such as trade, development and foreign policy also 
prevented countries from strong reactions against migrants, as did obligations un-
dertaken in bi- and multilateral agreements and the existence of migrants’ acquired 
rights. Especially countries with a “welcome the skilled, rotate the unskilled” policy 
in place prior to the crisis have seen no need for implementing changes that would 
have led to a wide publicity. 
Migrant workers have contributed to creating wealth and development in their 
host countries but the crisis has produced a climate of protectionism, an environ-
ment where this proposition is being challenged. One needs to devise strategies 
that reinforce the recognition of the positive role of migrant workers and protect 
them.
It will also be important to look at the longer term, beyond the crisis. For exam-
ple, voluntary return programmes in response to the crisis will have to be assessed 
in terms of the messages they convey and whether it makes sense to have migrants 
return to their home countries who have made efforts to integrate and whose labour 
force may be needed soon again. 
To reinforce the respect for rights at all levels will be crucial: national labour 
legislation, international labour standards, and general human rights law. This will 
include to closely monitor the application of labour laws to migrant workers (condi-
tions of work, minimum employment standards, etc.); check whether labour laws 
and labour migration policies correspond to international labour standards; and in 
efforts to curb irregular migration, strictly observe international human rights law.
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On the positive side, the crisis has led to a shift in perspective about the State 
and its role in economics which is now seen as useful instead of undesired. Previ-
ously prevailing neo-liberal thought relegated the State to the “high politics” of sov-
ereignty and security issues. The crisis has highlighted labour market issues, and 
migrants are now increasingly portrayed as economic agents instead of security 
threats. This offers room for the State to assert its protective role vis-à-vis migrant 
workers – a welcome development.
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